From Religiousness A to Religiousness B: The Leap

From Religiousness A to Religiousness B: The Leap
Derek M. Larson
Dr. Joseph Davis
PHIL 4123 01
November 29, 2010
Southeastern University
From Religiousness A to Religiousness B: The Leap


The legacy left behind by nineteenth century Søren Kierkegaard will ever
be remembered and extensive. He appealed to fields of philosophy, literature, theology
and the like, yet while so doing maintained a common goal throughout. Kierkegaard
aimed not at becoming some great theologian or philosopher, nor did he aspire to
comprehend the grandiose nature of God, nor did he set out to write the greatest of
literature. Instead, Kierkegaard spent a lifetime trying to understand the self and its
relation to Creator. He did not seek this simply for himself, but to help lead and share
with all men and women in hopes that they may obtain a right and healthy relationship
with God. As Kierkegaardian scholar, Louis P. Pojman, has written, “His [Kierkegaardʼs]
purpose in writing is not primarily theoretical but practical. He wants to help men and
women exist, not learn to speculate on ʻexistenceʼ—even though he speculates on the
concept a good deal himself.”1 For Kierkegaard, the goal of life is to reach a point of
dependence not on rationale, dogma, or doctrine, but on God himself.

To express this view, Kierkegaard developed a progression of human existence,
dividing it into three main spheres or stages: the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious.
In the aesthetic stage an individual lives life based on his or her own desires or
passions. Many who live within this stage, however, find that life unsatisfying and move
into the next sphere of ethics. In this stage, a person adopts the social norms of ethics
and morality into his or her life. Naturally, this stage often leads to the development of
some relationship with God in the religious stage. Ethics, when looked at deeply,
necessarily involve an ethics maker, God. A person who adopts a system of ethics may
Larson 2
1
Louis P. Pojman, The Logic of Subjectivity (University, AL: The University of Alabama Press: 1984), 23.
find his or herself confronted with thoughts of the divine. Kierkegaard makes a clear
distinction, however, between two types of religious existence. Religiousness A basically
adopts a system of reasonable ethics and places it within a religious framework of
doctrine and dogma. Religiousness B frees itself from such firm systematic systems of
religion and enters into a realm of subjective faith. This paper follows the ʻleapʼ from
Religiousness A to Religiousness B in Kierkegaardʼs philosophy by addressing three
areas of philosophy: reason, objectivity, and subjectivity. Its claim is that in order to
make the leap of faith into Religiousness B, a person must (consciously or not) assume
that reason, while useful, is limited and incapable of providing certain truths, showing
necessarily that humans have not access to any kind of objectivity. However, despite
this assumption, to complete the leap, a person must embrace his or her own
subjectivity depending not on empirical evidence or reasoning but on Godʼs revelation.
Only then can God be found not in the hand of humanity, but humanity in the hand of
God. As Kierkegaard has written, “You cannot get the truth by capturing it, only by its
capturing you.”2

The first point in taking the leap of faith assumes the limits of reason and
rationality. This section will be separated into four main divisions adapted from Louis P.
Pojmanʼs book, The Logic of Subjectivity, in his discussion on rationality. These
divisions include:
1. Reason is useful but limited.
2. Reason imparts only possibility or probability.
3. Reason eludes reality by using language.
Larson 3
2
Soren Kierkegaard, Søren Kierkegaard : Papers and Journals, trans. Alastair Hannay (New York:
Penguin Books, 1996),.
4. Reason is not the sole aspect of man, but fits into a more complete essence.3

First, Kierkegaard shows that reason is limited in that it can only make claims
based on its knowledge and experience. History gives many great examples of how this
concept may come into play. There was a time when common knowledge said that the
world was flat. All empirical evidence and reason demonstrated this fact by observing
that objects did not fall as they did on vertical planes. All knowledge and experience
directed men and women to believe this fact. Of course given a broader array of
knowledge and experience with time and the rise of Greek academics, this view was
revealed to be false. In the same sense, reason may be a legitimate process for
examining issues of truth, however without absolute knowledge and unending
experience, reason can only speak indefinitely—even regarding that which it has
experienced since even things experienced may be related to that which has not been
experienced. This concept may be seen at a minimum within the practical world since a
great deal of human experience and knowledge is spent within the practical (though
most would say there is always room for improvement or more experience in any topic
or task), but it is much more apparent when relating to eternal issues or theological
concepts. In his book, Philosophical Fragments, Kierkegaard, writing under the
pseudonym Johannes Climacus, explores the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation and
its paradoxical nature.4 The law of noncontradiction declares that is impossible for A to
both equal B and not equal B at the same time. This concept, however, presupposes
the knowledge of what both A and B are. Logically, it can be said that God cannot be
Larson 4
3
Louis P. Pojman, The Logic of Subjectivity (University, AL: The University of Alabama Press: 1984), 26.
4
Soren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1985).
both all God and all human at the same time, but this statement does not take into
account questions of the nature of Godʼs existence; it presupposes that Godʼs existence
operates in the same way as we understand human existence (although Climacus, in
Philosophical Fragments, questions whether it is even possible to understand human
existence). This argument does not prove the possibility of the Incarnation, neither does
it negate it. Instead, it simply shows that because of the lack of experience and
knowledge of the divine, reason cannot make a definitive claim on such an event.
Reason shows itself to be limited, although not fully useless. C. Stephen Evans writes,
“Although our experience gives us inductive, empirical evidence that it is impossible for
something to be both eternal and temporal, this evidence is not logically decisive. It may
simply reflect the limitations of our human experience.”5 A critique of this thought begs
the question of whether the reasonableness of this concept of limitations is legitimate
since it is discovered through reason itself. Kierkegaard would say that because reason
tells the thinker of its own limitations, it cannot be certain as to whether this claim is
truth, however, Kierkegaard—unlike many skeptics—was not afraid to use reason as a
source of information despite its lack of reliability and subjective nature. This will be
discussed in a later section.

It is important to note here that Kierkegaard does not view the limitations of
reason as a flaw or a product of humanityʼs sinful nature. Instead, the flaw comes at the
point of reasonʼs arrogance and hesitation to admitting its own limitations. When reason
claims to go further than it is capable, the sinful nature of humanity shows itself to be
present. In a world where Godʼs will is done, reason gladly submits itself to the revealed
Larson 5
5
C. Stephens Evans, Kierkegaard: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 153.
paradox. Climacus compares the relationship of reason and the revealed paradox to the
nature of love. “Self-love lies at the basis of love, but at its peak its paradoxical passion
wills its own downfall.”6 In other words, love may begin with a self-love (“I love you
because of the way you treat me or make me feel”), but it comes to a point where it
sacrifices itself for the other. “I find my greatest happiness when I place the happiness
of the other above my own happiness. Self-love is dethroned, but somehow fulfilled as
well.”7 Kierkegaard believed that this same principle can be applied to reason and its
relation to the revealed paradox. By declaring its limitations, reason finds its fulfillment.

The second point taken from Pojman says that all processes of reason only point
to possibility, or at best probability. In order to know any one thing, certitude is needed,
but reason is incapable of producing absolutes even under the most empirically reliable
circumstances, whether it be by inductive or deductive reasoning. Inductive reasoning
may be helpful to make estimated predictions, but it works only from experience. Since
a person has not experienced the future nor all possible outcomes related to that object
being sought after, all one can say is that previously an event acted a certain way, and
so it might operate the same way in the future. This may be very reliable depending
upon the amount of experience available, however it does not bring certitude. Deductive
reasoning may come closer to accuracy, but it presupposes it knows anything at all. It
assumes those basic beliefs that all may uphold practically, but are not reliable to stay
consistent in everyday life. At any moment, an individual may discover that he or she is
Larson 6
6
Soren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1985), 48.
7
C. Stephens Evans, Kierkegaard: An Introduction (Cambrige: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 157.
a part of the Matrix or dreaming. Perhaps the individual will never know that he or she
has been deceived at all. One can never know.

The third point relates to the concept of reason being expressed in a system of
symbols and ideals—namely, language. Kierkegaard expressed his views on the limits
of language long before Jacques Derridaʼs famous work, Of Grammatology, written in
1967. Although less developed than Derrida, Kierkegaard takes this idea from Platoʼs
theory of forms. Words do not express reality, but instead they express an ideal that
does not contain the immanent. Words take into account previous experiences and
attempt to define present objects and events. Language can be a very useful tool,
however it tends to reduce reality into metaphors and symbols that come short of
expressing the intended. Even if some certitude had been grasped by any given person,
any attempt to express this certitude to another—or even to oneself—would ultimately
be an estimation.

The last point Pojman expresses regarding Kierkegaardʼs views on rationality
deals with the essence of a person. There has arisen in philosophy an eager attempt to
extinguish all forms of emotion and passion to reach some level of reasonable
objectivity. Kierkegaard, presupposing the Bible, makes a claim that this act denies a
crucial aspect of the essence of a human being. God did not create in humanity only the
mind, but also the emotion. Jesus expresses this belief himself in Matthew 22 when he
refers back to the sacred Deuteronomy passage. “Love the Lord your God with all your
heart and with all your soul and with all your mind.”8 To deny the role of emotions in
ones search for truth and the divine is to deny a large portion of Godʼs creation. Many
Larson 7
8
Matthew 22:37 (NIV).
feel that emotions are flawed, not being able to reflect reality, however as shown above,
reason, too, is flawed—separate from reality. The whole person rejects neither reason
nor passion, but finds place for each in balance.

The necessary implication of these four claims is that humans have no access to
any form of objective truth. This, however, does not necessarily mean that there is no
objective truth—such a claim would be self-defeating, but neither does it affirm the
existence of objective truth. Given the presupposition of God in Kierkegaardʼs
philosophy, one might assume that there is an absolute objectivity that only God can
access since God is assumed to have absolute knowledge, however such a claim
cannot be given certitude. Evans writes,

“Reality may be a system for God, and Godʼs view of things may provide the

ultimate truth that we aim to approximate in our own cognitive endeavors, but we

must never confuse our approximations, useful and valuable as they may be,

with the thing itself. Truth in this sense may be real, but it is an abstraction, not a

temporal reality.”9
The key word in this quote is “may.” Reality may be a system for God, and is even
logically warranted, but by nature of reasonʼs limits, no one can make such a definitive
claim. Many, at this point, find themselves in the realm of skepticism or nihilism; for if
nothing can be known with certitude, what then can be said at all? This locale of thought
may be called the abyss of despair or as Saint John of the Cross has said, “the dark
night of the soul.” All things are questioned, and even the existence of God is doubted.
Where can one go at the end of their own rope? There are some who attempt to make
sense of this by presupposing God. If God were to exist, than surely he would be able to
make himself known to humanity, giving them objective truths. However, if one chooses
Larson 8
9
C. Stephens Evans, Kierkegaard: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 59.
to operate under the assumption that there is a God and God has access to objective
truth, this question of revelation may be more complex: Can God reveal his objective
truth to humanity—even within their own subjectivity? The assumed nature of God
makes the claim that since God is omnipotent, he necessarily would be able to override
the subjectivity of humanity in his revelation of absolute truths. The assumed nature of
humanity claims that even if God were to reveal objective truths, people necessarily
interpret these truths through a subjective lens. Which view then, holds more weight?
Kierkegaard transcends such questions in his view of subjectivity. Though Kierkegaard
highly emphasizes revelation, the point for him goes beyond simply receiving definite
knowledge.10 For Kierkegaard, to ask such a question continues to presuppose that the
desired goal is objective truth, when this should not be the intention of the seeker. God
did not create humans as objective creatures—they are subjective by nature. The goal
is not objectivity, which strays from the nature God has created men and women in, the
goal is God himself. Kierkegaard has faith that God has revealed himself and other
truths, but such knowledge of the revealed continues to be subjective by nature since it
is received by people. One may choose to wallow in the abyss of despair while
continuing to seek objective truth, mourning with failure, or one may choose the way of
Kierkegaard: to embrace oneʼs own subjectivity taking a leap of faith, seemingly
unwarranted, believing that if there is a God, he will be experienced in some way.

Kierkegaardʼs view of subjectivity does not attempt to solve the epistemological
debate as to whether the object gives any information to the subject, nor is it some form
Larson 9
10
In fact, he passionately defends the idea of revelation in his essay, Of the Difference Between a Genius
and an Apostle in:
Soren Kierkegaard, The Present Age: On the Death of Rebellion, trans. Alexander Dru (New York: Harper
Perennial, 1962).
of relativity. Instead, Kierkegaardʼs subjectivity has two parts. The first says what has
been demonstrated up to this point: that humans are by nature incapable of grasping
the absolute. The second part recognizes the legitimacy of inward emotions and
passions in regards to interpreting truth. For Kierkegaard, in order to be a whole person,
that person must embrace his or her own subjectivity, grasping life not with certitude,
but with faith and passion.

“To see we must stand somewhere and trust that our perspective, including our

emotional ʻtakeʼ on the world, finite and limited as it is, is one that enables us to

see something...Kierkegaard believes that in one sense our questions are never

ʻsettled,ʼ since we do not have the system. Doubts can always be raised, and

questions can always be asked. If we demand intellectual certainty before we

begin to live our convictions we will never live at all.”11

Many cannot make such a leap because of their dependence upon their own
reason. Even Johannes Climacus in Concluding Unscientific Postscript expresses his
inability to make such a leap as required by the Christian faith. It is important to note,
however, that Kierkegaard does believe that God speaks and gives his revelation. Such
a revelation can always be doubted, but men and women are encountered everyday by
whispers and shadows of truth. They cannot be confirmed or denied, and yet they at
least seem to be present. Kierkegaardʼs view of subjectivity gives itself over to these
whispers of truth. In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard demonstrates this concept by
citing the story of Abraham.12 In the Genesis account, Abraham is encountered with the
voice of God telling him to sacrifice his only son of promise. All reason and ethics say to
Abraham that this cannot be the voice of God, and yet the whisper remains. Abraham
could have spent much time doubting the voice, or perhaps he could disobey the voice.
Larson 10
11
C. Stephens Evans, Kierkegaard: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 64.
12
Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans. Alastair Hannay (New York: Penguin Books, 1985).
He could make many rational claims against the voice; he could simply write the
whisper off as a product of his evil imagination or some demonic creature.
Nevertheless, he gives himself over in faith to what the voice, he believes to be God,
has said, bringing his only son, Isaac, to that mount in Moriah. Kierkegaard deems him
in this act “the knight of faith.” Such an act is not warranted— is even contrary to
reason! It disobeys the very system of ethics that God had supposedly created, and yet
in this final stage of existence, men and women no longer live only based on reason or
ethics, but on faith. Trust must be given ultimately to God. In his book, Christian
Discourses, Kierkegaard expresses his belief that though there is no certainty in this life,
and though every ʻrevelationʼ may be doubted, the nature of this leap of faith trusts that
God will sustain his people.

“Truly, no more than God allows a species of fish to come into existence in a
particular lake unless the plant that is its nourishment is also growing there, no more will
God allow the truly concerned person to be ignorant of what he is to believe. That is its
need brings the nourishment along with it; what is sought is in the seeking that seeks it;
faith is in the concern over not having faith; love is in the self-concern over not loving.”13

The task of taking the leap of faith from Religiousness A to Religiousness B is not
an easy task or concept. It is not a simple truth that may be easily accepted without
reservation; it is something that must be wrestled with over a period of time. Indeed
Kierkegaard believed that few persons have ever even accomplished this task, but it
must be the goal of every person. This paper has shown that in order to do so, one
must find that their reason is limited and disconnected from the absolute. As such, there
is no access to objective knowledge from the human perspective, and yet at this point
the person must embrace their own subjectivity has an intention of God, building their
Larson 11
13
Soren Kierkegaard, Christian Discourses, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1997), 244.
foundation not on reason nor absolutes, but on faith. In this leap, an individual finds the
fullness of dependence. Just as love and reason sacrifice themselves to find their
fulfillment, so every man and woman should pursue such a paradox as this leap of faith
so that they, too, may find their fulfillment.


Larson 12
Bibliography
Clark, Kelly James, Richard Lints and James K. A. Smith, ed. 101 Key Terms in

Philosophy and Their Importance for Theology. Louisville: Wesminster John Knox

Press, 2004.
Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology. Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak.

Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1974.
Evans, C. Stephens. Kierkegaard: An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 2009.
Hong, Howard V. and Edna H. Hong, ed. The Essential Kierkegaard. Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1995.
Kierkegaard, Søren. Christian Discourses. Translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H.

Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.
Kierkegaard, Søren. Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments.

Translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1992.
Kierkegaard, Søren. Fear and Trembling. Translated by Alastair Hannay. New York:

Penguin Books, 1985.
Kierkegaard, Søren. Philosophical Fragments. Translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna

H. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.
Kierkegaard, Søren. The Present Age: On the Death of Rebellion. Translated by

Alexander Dru. New York: Harper Perennial, 1962.
Kierkegaard, Søren. Søren Kierkegaard : Papers and Journals. Translated by Alastair

Hannay. New York: Penguin Books, 1996.
Pojman, Louis P. The Logic of Subjectivity. University, AL: The University of Alabama

Press: 1984.
Larson 13